This paper investigates the causal relationships between the military expenditures and military burden of the four major sides of the Israeli-Arab conflict, namely, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria over the period . We utilize both the causality test suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and the generalized forecast error variance decomposition method of Pesaran and Shin (1998). Our findings suggest weak causality that runs usually from Israel's to Arab's military spending. The strongest links are between Israel and Syria that are still in a state of enmity. No causality was detected between Israel's and Jordan's military spending.
Introduction
The Israeli-Arab conflict has been one of the longest conflicts that involved either directly or indirectly not only Israel and its neighboring Arab countries but also the major super powers who acted to maintain their presence and influence in the oil-rich region. The intensity of this international battle field is reflected, at least partially, in the hefty portions of the limited resources of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria that were devoted to military expenditures and accumulation of weapons. Graph 1 demonstrates the exceptionally high military burdens, measured as the shares of military expenditures in GDP, of these countries over the period . For example, Egypt's military burden exceeded 50% in the mid-70s while Israel's topped 20%. Although the 90s, following the initiation of peace talks, have witnessed a drastic decline to levels below 10% for all countries, these levels of military burden remained very high in international standards. In light of the frequent confrontations and the hefty military budgets, many studies have indicated that that Israel and its Arab neighbors are engaged in an arms race.
A typical examination of the existence of arms race is based on the Richardson (1960) model in which the military expenditure, arsenal of weapons, and military personnel of one country change in response to those of the rival country. Thus, the dynamics of military expenditures are shaped by an action-reaction framework. Understanding these patterns of action-reaction among likely rivals is critical in our global world. A country or an international institution that provides foreign aid to a country that is involved in arms race may fuel conflicts by leading to a rise not only in the military expenditures of that country but also in the military expenditures of its rivals. Realizing that the grantee country is involved in an arms race, the granting bodies may restrict the use of their funds to growth-enhancing civilian uses, require compliance to arms control agreements, and exercise political and economic pressures to try to cease the hostile operations instead of fueling conflict. 1 Arms races are often examined using Granger causality tests that have been shown to have non-standard asymptotic properties if the variables are integrated or cointegrated. 2 Moreover, the need for pretests for unit roots and cointegration and the inapplicability when the variables have different orders of integration further add to the distortions associated with Granger causality from within VAR or vector error correction (VEC) settings. Examples of using the traditional Granger causality to assess the existence of arms races include, but not limited to, Kollias and Makrydakis (1997) , Dunne et al. (2005) , and Yildirim and Ocal (2006) . Only few studies have addressed the existence and the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab arms race. These include Linden (1991) , Chen et al. (1996) , Seiglie and Liu (2002) , and Sprecher and DeRouen (2002) . A brief review of their findings follows in section 3.
In this paper we reassess the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict focusing mainly on whether an arms race exists between Israel and its major adversaries, namely, Egypt, Jordan and Syria.
3 Unlike other studies that have used the traditional Granger causality test or causality from within a VEC, we utilize a causality procedure suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) . Their procedure requires the estimation of an augmented VAR that guarantees the asymptotic distribution of the Wald statistic. Also, the procedure does not require pre-testing for integration 1 Kinsella (1994) and others found that American aid to Israel has contributed to its economy and decreased the likelihood of military intervention in the region. No such evidence was found for the Soviet aid to Arab countries.
Moreover, the U.S. provided foreign aid to Egypt after signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979.
4 or cointegration properties of the VAR system, and thus avoids the potential biases of pretesting.
We conduct our causality analysis using two specifications; first, causality in a bivariate VAR system in which we examine causality between Israel's military measures and each of the Arab countries measures separately; second, causality in a quadvariate VAR system in which the military measures of the four countries are present in the system. This specification allows for possible complementary relationships as well as "free riding" among the military measures of the Arab countries that face a common Israeli threat. Additionally, we construct an aggregate measure for the Arab military expenditure and military burden for the case that Israel reacts to the Arab bloc as a group rather than individually.
4
To gauge the sensitivity of our results we incorporate the likely structural break dates as reported by Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008) in our causality analysis. Most of the previous studies failed to account for structural breaks when testing for arms races. Furthermore, we examine whether the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict changed following the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979.
In addition to using the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) , we examine the out-of-sample causality using the generalized forecast error variance decomposition method of Pesaran and Shin (1998) . Unlike the traditional orthogonalized Cholesky method, this method does not require ordering of the variables in the VAR system, something that is often determined arbitrary given the absence of sound theoretical base.
The remaining of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the major events that shaped the Israeli-Arab conflict and their impact on accumulation of arms. A 5 brief review of the few studies that addressed the existence and the dynamics of the conflict is provided in section 3. Section 4 lays out the econometric foundations of our empirical investigation. Description of our data and its sources are presented in section 5, followed by a discussion of the causality tests and FEVD results in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
The Israeli-Arab Conflict: A Timeline
Several wars and military actions took place in the region since the UN proposed its Once the Israel-Egypt peace treaty was finalized, the focus shifted to the Palestinian 
Previous Studies
The likely Israeli-Arab arms race received negligible attention in the arms race literature, mainly due to lack of reliable data. The few studies, surveyed below, that examined the issue have conducted the analysis in the context of the determinants of military spending or using the traditional causality tests. Generally speaking, these studies mostly reveal a one-way arms race from Israeli to Arab military spending.
In an attempt to analyze the determinants of the Israeli military spending over the period 1960 -1979 , McGuire (1982 , 1987 All the previous studies that addressed the existence and the nature of the conflict have applied traditional causality tests from within VAR or VEC settings. As we stated earlier, the traditional Granger causality tests from within VAR and VEC have non-standard asymptotic properties and are subject to pre-testing biases.
Econometric Methodologies
Economists often utilize vector autoregressions (VARs) to make inferences on causal relationships among endogenous variables. However Sims et al. (1990) . Toda and Yamamoto (1995) proved that the Wald statistic for testing the above null hypothesis converges in distribution to a 2 p χ random variable. The application of this procedure ensures that the usual test statistic for Granger causality has the standard asymptotic distribution and valid inference can be carried out (Zapata and Rambaldi, 1997) .
FEVD has been used repeatedly by economists to examine the out-of-sample properties of the relationship between the variables in a VAR system. The method enables researchers to shed light not only on the direction but also on the intensity of the causal relationships between variables. Generally speaking, FEVD analysis decomposes the forecast error variance of a variable into proportions attributed to shocks in other variables, as well as its own. Most researchers have used the Cholesky decomposition that requires ordering of the variables.
Without a sound theoretical base, ordering is arbitrary and the results may vary greatly depending on the ordering. Furthermore, the orthogonalized FEVD and impulse response functions are unlikely to be appropriate for analyzing arms races (Smith et al., 2000) . As an alternative, Pesaran and Shin (1998) proposed a generalized FEVD that circumvent the need for ordering the variables and produce unique results by utilizing the contemporaneous correlations of the variables under investigation. Unlike the traditional decomposition the generalized FEVD does not impose the restriction that the underlying shocks to the VAR are orthogonalized prior to decomposing the forecast error variances.
Data Description and Sources
Raw data were obtained from the following two main sources. We also constructed an aggregated series for the three Arab countries to which we refer as "Arab" to allow for possible collective action of Arabs against Israel as advised by Olson (1971) . For real military expenditures this series is simply the sum of the military expenditures whereas for military burden, it is defined as this sum divided by the total GDP of these countries. These series are dominated by the figures of Egypt, the largest economy among the front line countries.
Results
Our causality analysis is conducted under two specifications. First, causality in a bivariate VAR system in which we examine causality between Israel's military measures and each of the Arab countries measures separately. Second, causality in a quadvariate VAR system in which the military measures of the four countries are present in the system. This specification allows for possible complementary relationships as well as "free riding" among the military measures of the Arab countries that face a common threat.
A necessary step for causality tests based on the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) is to determine the maximal order of integration of the series in the VAR system. The results of the ADF test for the real military expenditures and the military burden for the four countries and the aggregated "Arab" series are reported in Table 1 . We determined the optimal lag order based on SIC. All series are found to be integrated of order 1. Thus, the maximum order of integration (d max ) in the VAR system is 1 throughout. Table 2 presents the results of the causality tests for the bivariate specification over the whole period 1960-2004. The optimal lag order of the VAR system is determined using SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. The reported lags represent the lag order under which no serial correlation of order up to 4 was detected. When real military expenditures are considered, the results indicate that causality runs, in general, from Israel's military expenditures to those of Egypt, Syria, and the aggregated "Arab" measure. While our results show that Egypt reacts to changes in Israel's military expenditures, a bi-directional causality is detected only between Israel and Syria, and no causality whatsoever is detected in the case of Jordan. It seems that the latter, the smallest economy among the Arab front line countries, does not constitute a factor in the arms race in the region and might have chosen to behave as a free rider as implied by Chen et al. (1996) . The causality from Israel's military expenditures to Egypt and Syria's expenditures is a weak one since it is valid only at the 10% significance level. This observation is further validated when the military measure is the military burden. Causality is now detected only from Israel's military burden to Egypt's. Moreover, we still find that Israel reacts to changes in Syria's military burden. Once again, no causality is detected between the military measures of Israel and Jordan. Our findings are partially in line with Chen et al. (1996) who find that Egypt was the only country involved in a fierce arms race with Israel prior to 1979 while Jordan was a free rider and Syria was least responsive to changes in Israel's military spending.
To further investigate the possibility of Arab collective action and/or free riding we apply the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to a quadvariate VAR in which the military spending of each Arab country responds to other Arab countries spending in addition to Israel's. The results of the causality tests are presented in Table 3 . When real military spending is taken as the military measure we detect bidirectional causality between Israel and Syria with the causality from Israel's to Syria's military spending being marginally significant. Turning to causality in military burden, we only find a barely significant causality running from Egypt's to Israel's military burden.
Since many economic series, including defense spending may experience structural breaks that affect causality analysis we carried out the same tests incorporating two endogenously determined structural breaks that have been reported by Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader 
Summary
This article examines the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict over the period to determine whether an arms race exists between Israel and its Arab adversaries. To do so we apply two methodologies; first, a causality procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) that avoids the shortcomings that the traditional Granger causality tests suffer from; second, the Generalized FEVD proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) Optimal lag length based on SIC with 8 maximum lags allowed. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. indicates the direction of causality. Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. indicates the direction of causality. Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. indicates the direction of causality. Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. Break points based on Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008); Military expenditures -Egypt: 1969 , 1977 Israel: 1972 Israel: , 1982 Jordan: 1975 Jordan: , 1983 Syria: 1974 Syria: , 1986 Arab: 1968 , 1987 . Military burden -Egypt: 1969 , 1977 Israel: 1972 Israel: , 1986 Jordan: 1981 Jordan: , 1989 Syria: 1967 Syria: , 1986 Arab: 1969 Arab: , 1977 . indicates the direction of causality. Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. Break points based on Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008); Military expendituresEgypt: 1969 , 1977 Israel: 1972 Israel: , 1982 Jordan: 1975 Jordan: , 1983 Syria: 1974 Syria: , 1986 Arab: 1968 , 1987 . Military burden -Egypt: 1969 , 1977 Israel: 1972 Israel: , 1986 Jordan: 1981 Jordan: , 1989 Syria: 1967 Syria: , 1986 Arab: 1969 Arab: , 1977 . indicates the direction of causality. Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
